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IBSEC-CSS-M-17
13 January 1970

COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting
Held at CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia
13 January 1970

1.   The seventeenth meeting of the Computer Security Sub-
committee was held on 13 January 1970, between 1330 and 1600
hours in Room 4E-64, CIA Headquarters.   In attendance were:

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Mr. Richard F. Kitterman, State Member

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Mr. Thomas A. Eccleston, Army Member
Mr. Robert B. Cameron, Navy Member
Col. Charles V. Burns, Air Force Member

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Mr. Raymond J. Brady, AEC Member
Col. William D. Marsland, Jr., JCS/JCCRG Observer

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Mr. William S. Donaldson, Jr., USAF

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Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

2. The security level of the meeting was announced as Top Secret COMINT.

3. **Approval of Minutes:** The minutes of the 16 December 1969 meeting were approved without amendment.

4. **Computer Security Training Course:** The Chairman announced that the Army representative on the Training Course Task Team had been replaced by Mr. Kitterman of the Department of State. This replacement was predicated on a request from the Army SECOM member, who reported that the Army had been tasked from another source to participate in the development of a computer security course for DoD. In order to assist the Subcommittee in its efforts, the Army Subcommittee member was asked to provide any information available on this planned DoD course at the next meeting.

5. At the instant meeting, at the Chairman's request, Mr. Cameron reported the results of the Task Team's efforts in its first meeting. Key elements of his report were an initial draft statement of course objective, discussion of the advantages of adapting the DODCI course to meet Community requirements, and a preference on the Team's part to divide the course into two parts; the first to cover ADP fundamentals and the second to address the security aspects of the computer environment.

6. Subsequent discussion reflected views as previously discussed that the planned course limit its content to computer security issues with a prerequisite for attendance being previous basic ADP training. At the suggestion of the NSA representative it was subsequently recognized that a discussion of computer security could not be divorced totally from ADP fundamentals. Subcommittee discussion reflected general agreement and guidance was provided the Task Team that the course curriculum should be so structured to address the problems of computer security but to include, intermingled with such lectures, the required amount of instructions in ADP operations. It was also agreed that although previous ADP orientation would not be defined as a prerequisite, such fundamental training would be emphasized as being helpful to the prospective student in the computer security course.

-2-

S-E-C-R-E-T

7.   With reference to the Task Team's suggestion that the course be patterned after that of DODCI and with the support of the latter, it was concluded that this approach would not meet the needs of the Intelligence Community, especially since many of the latter's problems could not be outlined in a course content of no or a limited security classification.   The Task Team was advised that, although general assistance in the planning stage could be accepted from DODCI, the operation and structuring of the course itself should be handled as an independent Community project under Subcommittee guidance and control.

8.   Further discussion was had at the instant meeting on the necessity for two levels of training in computer security.   Inherent in the analysis of requirements for basic and advanced computer security courses, it was recognized, identification of the type of people for whom the course is proposed is paramount.   As a result of a suggestion from the State member, the Chairman outlined for Subcommittee choice the possibility of structuring the course toward one of three levels:

A.   Briefing of security personnel on the fact that there are peculiar aspects in securing the operation of modern computers; a course structured at this level would simply identify the many security vulnerabilities in the computer processing of classified material.

B.   Instruction to security personnel on how to cope with problems encountered in modern computer operations; a course at this level would not only identify the vulnerable areas but also provide guidance on how to handle these problems either for the purpose of resolution or to indicate what types of support are required for their ultimate solution.

-3-

S-E-C-R-E-T

C. A thorough indoctrination aimed not only at pro-
viding security officers with a methodology of
identifying and resolving individual computer
security problems but also in developing a
security officer into a trained system security
specialist, who would be prepared for the respon-
sibility of certifying that a given computer system
has the necessary protection features to be desig-
nated "secure".

A poll of the members reflected agreement that the planned training
course should be more than an orientation briefing on computer
security. The Subcommittee believed that the training course should
be aimed at the levels outlined in B and C above. Guidance was pro-
vided the Task Team to develop the course curriculum and structure
to meet the second level outlined, and to be ready to add to it at a later
date to raise its total level to that outlined in paragraph 8C above. In
this way it was believed that the current need for such training at the
second level could be met first. Subsequently, the Subcommittee's
efforts would be directed toward developing competent system security
specialists which are needed now in some but not all member agencies.

9. The Subcommittee expressed general approval of the Task
Team's consideration of two weeks as a length for the course. Opinion
was voiced that later raising of the course objective level might be
accomplished by adding one more week, perhaps composed of seminar
type instruction. This additional week might be a part of an overall
three week course or might be given separately for a fewer number
of students.

10. Degaussing Study: The Chairman advised that Col.
Marsland had provided him with an extract of pertinent portions of
the JCS paper mentioned at the previous meeting; he indicated that the
extract appeared very pertinent to the degaussing problem despite its
application restricted to SIOP material.

11. The Chairman also requested that the Task Team handling
the degaussing study begin addressing its project as soon as possible.
With this in mind he presented the following items as a guide in the
structuring of the draft paper:

-4-

A.   Definition of the problem in laymen terms;

B.   Historical outline on how the problem has been addressed to date;

C.   Description of the problem from a technical standpoint including identification of the factors, e.g., temperature, time, etc. involved;

D.   Background to the NSA role in addressing the problem as it relates to COMINT material;

E.   The results of NSA research as provided the Subcommittee;

F.   Guidance to the Community:

    (1)   Identification of appropriate regulations and directives which provide specific instructions in regard to degaussing and downgrading storage media containing special types of classified information;

    (2)   Identification of the factors and risks requiring consideration by responsible authority faced with a decision regarding the retrievability of classified information from computer storage media.

The NSA member noted his understanding that a document concerning degaussing with policy implications was currently being prepared by NSA. For this reason he suggested delaying the preparation of the Subcommittee paper temporarily. The Chairman acknowledged that the document under preparation might well be of assistance in the preparation of the Subcommittee report, but suggested against delaying preparation of the latter. It was foreseen that the NSA document might affect the final Subcommittee report but need not hold up efforts in the draft stage.

-5-

12. <u>Security Labeling Standards</u>: With reference to the Sub-committee's project on the problem of security labeling standards for community data bases, the Chairman announced that at the request of the NSA member he was preparing a joint memorandum for IHC and Security Committee members outlining the approach being taken to this problem by the System Design & Development Subcommittee and the Computer Security Subcommittee. He noted that this memorandum asks for the support of member agencies toward resolving an issue of current importance in the development of community data bases. The Chairman also indicated that he hoped that the Task Team would have its first meeting within two weeks.

13. <u>Multilevel Operations</u>: The Chairman advised that he had received individual member submissions for the multilevel operations paper from all agencies except Army and Navy. He requested that both be forwarded as soon as possible. The Chairman also referenced a COINS paper prepared by [   ]   STAT
and outlining a proposal for handling "need-to-know" in COINS. Although he did not anticipate discussing this paper at the Subcommittee, he called member attention to its dissemination. A proposal similar to that outlined in the COINS paper was deferred until the next meeting due to the lateness of the hour.

14. <u>Other Business</u>:

   A. Copies of articles from the 29 December 1969 issue of <u>Electronic News</u> and the 3 December 1969 issue of <u>Computerworld</u> were distributed to members. Both articles referred to the security of computer centers, the second relating to the storming of a Dow Chemical Company computer center by anti-war demonstrators, which resulted in the degaussing of 1,000 computer tapes;

   B. The Chairman called the attention of members to the fact that Subcommittee efforts being handled at the Task Team level were not meant to be complex undertakings requiring a large amount of resources. He explained that the Task Team approach was selected by him as a method of distributing the Subcommittee's overall work load.

-6-

14.   The next Subcommittee meeting was scheduled for
1330 hours on 27 January 1970.

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Chairman
Computer Security Subcommittee

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